Verify that authenticated API calls are made from our domain name.
Evil forms on other websites could otherwise potentially be configured to have action="https://gnusocial.example/api/statuses/update.json" or whatever. XHR is already blocked with CORS stuff. Really, why do browsers allow cross domain POSTs at all? Sigh. The web.
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@ -85,8 +85,10 @@ class ApiAuthAction extends ApiAction
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// NOTE: $this->scoped and $this->auth_user has to get set in
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// prepare(), not handle(), as subclasses use them in prepares.
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// Allow regular login session
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if (common_logged_in()) {
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// Allow regular login session, but we have to double-check the
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// HTTP_REFERER value to avoid cross domain POSTing since the API
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// doesn't use the "token" form field.
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if (common_logged_in() && common_local_referer()) {
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$this->scoped = Profile::current();
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$this->auth_user = $this->scoped->getUser();
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if (!$this->auth_user->hasRight(Right::API)) {
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@ -264,6 +264,11 @@ function common_logged_in()
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return (!is_null(common_current_user()));
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}
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function common_local_referer()
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{
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return parse_url($_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'], PHP_URL_HOST) === common_config('site', 'server');
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}
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function common_have_session()
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{
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return (0 != strcmp(session_id(), ''));
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